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Self determination for Western Sahara has been addressed in 43 resolu-
tions from the UN General Assembly since 19651, and in 64 resolutions from 
the UN Security Council since 19752. Moreover, the International Court of Jus-
tice, in its 1975 Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara concludes that "...the 
materials and information presented to it do not establish ties of territorial sov-
ereignty [... ] as might affect the application of General Assembly Resolution 
1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara, and, in particular, of the 
principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the 
will of the peoples of the Territory..."3. Self-determination is recognized both 
as a principle and as a human rights of peoples4. 
1. In the most recent resolution, AJRES/63/105 (2008), paragraph 2 reads (extracts): "... 
achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the 
self-determination of the people of Western Sahara...". 
2. The most recent resolution, S/RES/1871 (2009) has in paragraph 4 an identical formula-
tion as found in ibid, paragraph 2. 
3. Western Sahara Advisory Opinion (1975), paragraph 162, ICJ Report p. 68. General 
Assembly resolution A/RES/1514(XV) (1960) "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples" reads in paragraph 2: "All peoples have the right to self-de-
termination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status andfreely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development". 
4. In addition to resolution A/RES/1514, common Article 1 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), recognize the right of peoples to self-determination, in the context of 
"political status" and "economic, social and cultural development" (Article 1.1); "natural wealth 
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Self-determination is also recognized by the First Additional Protocol to 
the Geneva Conventions5. In this context it must also be observed that West-
ern Sahara by the UN General Assembly has also been recognized as being 
a question of occupation6 and decolonization7. The most frequent references 
regarding the status of Western Sahara, however, is to recognize it as a non-
self-governing territory, which is regulated by Chapter XI of the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
Despite these rich sources confirming the applicability of self-determina-
tion specifically regarding Western Sahara, there are no clear signs indicating 
that a solution is going to be reached soon. The United Nation's MLNURSO 
(United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara), established 
precisely with the mandate of overseeing a referendum on the status of the 
territory, is about to enter its 18 th year, involving huge costs, but is far from 
achieving its objective. 
In the report to the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the 
Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples, the talks between the two parties, Front Polisario and 
Morocco, based on resolutions S/RES/1754 are summarized as follows: "... 
although the parties dynamically interacted with each other, there had hardly 
been any exchange that could be characterized as negotiations"8. In an Annex to 
the last Secretary-General's report to the Security Council, the former Personal 
Envoy, Peter van Walsum, noted: "the parties continued to express strong dif-
ferences on the fundamental questions at stake"9. 
In his reflections after the mandate ended, van Walsum noted that ".. .the 
two main ingredients of the impasse were Morocco's decision of April 2004 
and resources" (Article 1.2) and "administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories" 
(Article 1.3). 
5. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), reads in paragraph 1.4: 
"The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed conflicts in which peoples 
are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the 
exercise of their right of self-determination. " 
6. A/Res/34/37 (1979), paragraphs 5 and 6. 
7. A/RES/45/21 (1990), paragraph 2. Note also that Western Sahara is regularly reviewed 
by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples ("Committee of 24"). 
8. S/2008/45 (2008), Report of the Secretary-General on the status and progress of the 
negotiations on Western Sahara', paragraph 4. 
9. S/2008/45, Annex, Communique of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for 
Western Sahara (in agreement with the parties), Greentree Estate, 9 January 2008. P. van Wal-
sum's mandate was not renewed after his fifth semiannual term was out on 21 August 2008. 
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not to accept any referendum with independence as an option, and the Secu-
rity Council's unwavering view that there must be a consensual solution to the 
question of Western Sahara. I focused on the latter.. ." 1 0. The problem for Mo-
rocco is the term "independence"11, as Morocco will only consider status quo 
or autonomy for Western Sahara as the options. 
Moreover, van Walsum states that the Security Council".. .has to take into 
account political reality" which includes "... fear of the destabilising effect of 
coercive action, awareness that redress of an injustice 33 years after the fact 
may entail new injustices, or reluctance to contribute to the possible creation 
of another failed state"12. These observations by the person who was given a 
mandate to assist in identifying a solution for Western Sahara based on self-
determination, indicate that the negotiations are not likely to proceed towards 
the holding of a referendum on the status of the territory of Western Sahara, 
implying that Saharawis will still be living as refugees in harsh conditions in 
Algeria and under Moroccan oppression in Western Sahara13. 
Hence, there is a need for a totally new approach in order to proceed to-
wards a solution where international law is not undermined by "political real-
ity". The article will first analyze the obligations arising under Chapter XI of 
the Charter of the United Nations, and to which extent these obligations still 
apply to Spain. Second, the different scenarios regarding Spain's international 
10. El Pais 28 August 2008: "Sahara's long and troubled conflict" by P. van Walsum; avail-
able at <Vvrww.elpais.corn/articulo/mtemacional/Sahara/s/long/and/troubled/conflict/elpepuint 
/20080828elpepuint_5/Tes>. The new US Administration has reportedly "disassociated itself 
from a Moroccan plan for autonomy for the disputed Western Sahara"; World Tribune 9 July 
2009: "Obama reverses Bush-backed Morocco plan in favor of Polisario state"; available at: 
<www.worldtribune.com/worldtribuneAVTARC/2009/af_morocco0547_07_09.asp>. While de-
tails on the new US policy are still not made public, the letter sent by Obama to the King Mo-
hammed VI on3 July 2009 refers directly to "UN-led negotiations", which we saw in note 1 and 
2 must build on the principle of self-determination. The new Special Envoy of the UN's Secre-
tary-General is Christopher W. S. Ross, former US ambassador to Algeria (1988-91) seemingly 
has another approach than Walsum, and hence could "make a difference"; Reuters 9 August 
2009: "Talks to resume on breaking Western Sahara deadlock"; available at: <www.alertnet.org/ 
thenews/newsdesk/L9539474.htm>. 
11. Independence is referred to as an option in the 1990 Report by the Secretary-General 
to the Security Council, S/21360, paragraphs 6 and 31, and in A/RES/45/21, paragraph 2. In 
the 2003 "Peace plan for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara" (Baker II plan), 
S/2003/565, Annex, paragraph 2 does not specify the questions, but refers to previous agree-
ment between the parties: "The options or ballot questions to be included in the referendum will 
include: (a) those previously agreed to in the settlement plan; and (b) any additional options or 
ballot questions agreed to by the Kingdom of Morocco and the Western Sahara Authority..." 
12. See note 10. 
13. See note 29. 
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responsibilities regarding Western Sahara, will be analyzed. Third, an analysis 
of whether it is realistic that the UN will be able to serve as the administrative 
authority for Western Sahara, will be undertaken, based on a trusteeship agree-
ment in accordance with Chapter XII of the UN Charter. Fourth, based on the 
phrase "states directly concerned" of Article 79 of the UN Charter, there will be 
an analysis of which States that are to take part in the drafting of the trusteeship 
agreement. Fifth, there will be an analysis of which powers the administering 
authority can exercise under the trusteeship system. Sixth, the various factual, 
strategic and institutional factors will be analyzed, based on the findings of the 
previous sections. Finally, the alternative options for establishing a UN admin-
istration in a territory, based on Chapter VII and not on Chapter XI or XII of 
the UN Charter, will be analyzed, based on the experiences from Kosovo and 
East Timor. 
While there are other authors analyzing direct administration by the UN 1 4, 
this chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of the UN Charter as applied to 
Western Sahara situation. 
I. UN CHARTER OBLIGATIONS REGARDING NON-SELF 
GOVERNING TERRITORIES, APPLIED TO WESTERN SAHARA 
Chapter XI of the UN Charter consists of only two Articles. Article 73 
reads (extracts): 
"Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the 
administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of 
self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these 
territories are paramount ,and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to 
the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the 
present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories... ". 
Five specific areas are then identified in litra (a)-(e), relating to culture; 
political aspirations; international peace and security; development; and sta-
tistical and other information. The phrases "the interests of the inhabitants" 
14. See WET, E. de, "The Direct Administration of Territories by the United Nations and 
its Member States in the Post-Cold War Era: Legal Implications and Consequences for Na-
tional Law", Max Planck UNYB 8 (2004), 291; STAHN, C , "The United Nations Transitional 
Administrations in Kosova and East Timor: A First Analysis", Max Planck UNYB 5 (2001), 105; 
WOLFRUM, R., "International Administration in Post-Conflict Situations by the United Nations 
and Other International Actors", Max Planck UNYB 9 (2005), 649. 
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and "the well-being of the inhabitants" are applied without defining the term 
"inhabitants". While the term "inhabitants" is used in the UN Charter, subse-
quent UN conventions, declaration and resolutions use the term "peoples"15. 
The term "peoples" refers to a defined community based on both objective and 
subjective criteria, and encompassed both "nations" and "indigenous peoples". 
The terms "paramount" and "sacred trust" of Article 73 cannot be interpreted 
differently than to provide a strong obligation on States having responsibility 
for the administration of non-self-goveming territories. The reference of Article 
76 on "trust territories" to Article 1 of the UN Charter is not included in Article 
73 on "non-self-governing territories". This implies that Article 76 must be un-
derstood to provide for a stronger human protection compared with Article 73. 
Article 74 of the UN Charter is on general obligations applying to all 
States, not only those which have responsibility for the administration of non-
self-goveming territories. The Article reads (extracts): 
"Members of the United Nations also agree that their policy in respect of the 
territories to which this Chapter applies [...] must be based on the general princi-
ple of good-neighbourliness...". 
Hence, Morocco, shall, as all other States, conduct their policies towards 
Western Sahara based on mutual cooperation, and in such a way that Western 
Sahara shall not be forced into economic dependency with any States. This 
principle is specified by the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations16. 
The most specific international obligation for those States having the re-
sponsibility for the administration of non-self-goveming territories, also termed 
"administering power", are found in Article 73(e), which says that the states 
shall (extracts): 
"transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, sub-
ject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, 
15. ICCPRand ICESCR, seenote4, article l;A/RES/1514(XV); see note 3; A/RES/'1541(XV) 
Principles which should guide Members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to 
transmit the information calledfor under Article 73 e of the Charter, principle 1. 
16. A/RES/2625 (XXV) (1970), being a codification of the following principles: (i) refrain 
from the threat or use of force against any state; (ii) settle disputes by peaceful means; (iii) duty 
not to intervene in matters within a state's domestic jurisdiction; (iv) duty to cooperate; (v) the 
principle of equal rights and self determination of peoples; (vi) the principle of sovereign equal-
ity of states; (vii) the principle that states shall fulfill their charter obligations in good faith. 
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statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, 
and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively re-
sponsible... ". 
The areas which shall be reported on must be said to be relevant both for 
the purpose of preserving the inhabitants "interests" and "well-being", in ac-
cordance with the introductory part of Article 73 of the UN Charter, and the 
peoples" rights to self-determination, as recognized in common Article 1 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
Since Western Sahara is recognized as being a non-self-governing terri-
tory, there must be a State which has the responsibility for the administration 
of Western Sahara, in order to further its inhabitants" interests and well-being, 
and promote the realization of the right to self-determination for peoples liv-
ing in non-self-governing and trust territories, in accordance with Article 1.3 
of the ICCPR and the ICESCR. There is, however, no State which currently 
complies with Article 73(e) regarding Western Sahara. How can this situation 
be explained? 
The United Nations itself makes this general statement of how Spain re-
lieved itself from its obligations under the UN Charter with regard to Western 
Sahara: 
"On 26 February 1976, Spain informed the Secretary-General that as 
of that date it had terminated its presence in the Territory of the Sahara and 
deemed it necessary to place on record that Spain considered itself thenceforth 
exempt from any responsibility of any international nature in connection with 
the administration of the Territory, in view of the cessation of its participation 
in the temporary administration established for the Territory. In 1990, the Gen-
eral Assembly reaffirmed that the question of Western Sahara was a question 
of decolonization which remained to be completed by the people of Western 
Sahara"17. 
This letter did not cause any protest, neither from Morocco, Mauretania or 
any other State. The statement that Spain considered itself "exempt from any 
responsibilities in connection with the administration of the Territory" implies 
that Spain implicitly acknowledged that the Madrid Accords entered into more 
17. United Nations: Non-Self-Governing Territories listed by GA in 2002, note 2; available 
at www.un.org/Depts/dpi/decolonization/trust3.htm. The same term is found in a 2005 UN bro-
chure on decolonization; see www.un.org/Depts/dpi/decolonization/Decolonization_brochure. 
pdf. 
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than three months earlier did not relieve it from its responsibilities with regard 
to Western Sahara. If Spain thought that the Madrid Accords were adequate, 
Spain would have said so. 
We will come back to the Madrid Accord below, but will note one ad-
ditional paragraph of the 26 February 1976 letter to the United Nations: "the 
decolonization of the Western Sahara will be reached when the opinion of the 
Saharawi population was validly expressed"18. This is another evidence that 
Spain in 1976 did not believe that any action taken in 1975-76 was sufficient for 
the expression of self-determination for the whole Saharawi population 
We see that Spain by a unilateral declaration "considered itself exempt 
from any responsibility" regarding the administration of the territory of West-
ern Sahara. It is reasonable to state that the 26 February 1976 unilateral declara-
tion of Spain has no status within international law. The former UN Under-Sec-
retary-General for Legal Affairs, Hans Corell, wrote in his letter to the Security 
Council that the status of an administering Power is "...a status which Spain 
alone could not have unilaterally transferred"19. 
The basis upon which Spain claimed to have exempted itself from its obli-
gation as administering power is a unilateral declaration. Such a declaration is 
in contradiction to the two resolutions on self-determination. First, resolution 
1514(XV)20, saying that self-determination is exercised when formerly colonial 
peoples freely determine their political status. Second, resolution 1541 (XV)21, 
giving three options for when a non-Self-Governing Territory can be said to 
have reached a full measure of self-government: (a) Emergence as a sovereign 
independent State; (b) Free association with an independent State; or (c) Inte-
gration with an independent State. 
Both of the latter options are only to be made after a ".. .free and voluntary 
choice by the peoples of the territory concerned expressed through informed 
and democratic processes"22, and ".. .peoples acting with full knowledge of the 
18. MIGUEL, C.R., Spain's legal obligations as administering power of Western Sahara, 
2008, 12. Available at http://www.gees.org/articulo/6096/. 
19. United Nations 2002: Letter dated 29 January 2002 from the Under-Secretary-Gen-
eral for Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel, addressed to the President of the Security Council, 
S/2002/161, paragraph 6. Explicit recognition of Spain as a de jure administering authority of 
Western Sahara is provided both in CRAWFORD, J., The Creation of States in International Law, 
2006, 117 , and in SIMMA, B . (ed), The Charter of the United Nations, A Commentary, vol. II 
(Second Edition), 1994, 1095. 
20. See note 4. 
21. See note 15, principle V I . 
22. Ibid., principle VII(a) (extracts). 
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change in their status, their wishes having been expressed through informed 
and democratic processes, impartially conducted and based on universal adult 
suffrage"23, respectively. These principles have not been observed when Spain 
unilaterally exempted itself from "any responsibility" regarding the administra-
tion of the territory of Western Sahara. Hence, it must be understood that the 
unilateral declaration of 26 February 1976 is both in contradiction with interna-
tional law on the self determination of peoples, and is without any legal effect. 
There has been no formal endorsement to this unilateral declaration, nei-
ther in the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementa-
tion of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples, nor in the Trusteeship Council or in the Fourth Committee of the 
General Assembly. This lack of formal endorsement -or challenge- gives an 
even stronger indication that the 26 February 1976 unilateral declaration of 
Spain has no status within international law. 
We briefly referred to the Madrid Accords of 14 November 1975, between 
Mauretania, Morooco and Spain above. According to it, a ".. .temporary admin-
istration [...] in collaboration with the Djemaa"24 was to be set up. This agree-
ment is contradiction with the relevant UN resolutions on decolonization25, 
and has never been approved or endorsed by the UN 2 6. As the Madrid Accords 
does not comply with the UN resolutions on the right to self-determination, this 
agreement cannot be said to have any legal effect under international law, even 
if it is obvious that the Madrid Accords had political effect, as it provided for 
the Spanish withdrawal, and the Moroccan and Mauretanian occupation. Even 
23. Ibid., principle IX(b) (extracts). 
24. Madrid Accords (included in Security Council Official Records, Thirtieth Year, Supple-
ment for October, November and December 1975, document S/l 1880, Annex III), paragraph 2. 
25. A/RES/1514ÍXV) (note 3) andA/RES/1541(XV) (note 15). 
26. General Assembly Resolution A/RES/3458 (B) of 10 December 1975, which says in 
paragraph 1: "Takes note of the tripartite agreement concluded at Madrid on 14 November 1975 
by the Governments of Mauretania, Morocco and Spain, the text of which was transmitted to 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 18 November 1975" cannot be understood as a 
recognition of the Madrid Agreement, but only noting the existence of the Madrid Agreement. 
Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of A/RES/3458 (B) reads: "Reaffirms the inalienable right to self-deter-
mination"; "Requests the parties [...] to ensure respect of the freely expressed aspirations of the 
Saharan populations"; and "Requests the interim administration to take all necessary steps to 
ensure that all the Saharan populations originating in the Territory will be able to exercise their 
inalienable right to self-determination...", respectively. These three paragraphs state clearly that 
self-determination shall exercised by the Saharawis by their free expression; and the reference 
in the preamble to several UN resolutions, including A/RES/1514 (XV) and A/RES/1541 (XV), 
as well as the advisory opinion of 16 October 1975 by the International Court of Justice is an 
explicit confirmation of this. 
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if the Madrid Accord could have been proven to have a legal effect, this effect 
could last only as long as the "temporary administration" had the actual partici-
pation and presence from all the three parties to the Madrid Accords, which is 
not the case for Spain (since 1976) and Mauretania (since 1979). 
In addition, the following observation by James Crawford must be ac-
knowledged: "Chapter XI of the Charter appears to apply to defined territories 
irrespective of the consent of the States administering them.. ." 2 7. This must be 
understood to imply that Spain cannot take any measures to change neither the 
status of Western Sahara as a non-self-goveming territory, nor the obligations 
that has with regard to Western Sahara. 
Therefore, as Spain could not unilaterally exempt itself from its obligation 
relating to the administration of the territory of Western Sahara28, Spain must 
be understood to still be the administering power in Western Sahara. Morocco 
has never been the administering power of Western Sahara in accordance with 
the UN Charter, even if governmental structures are established by Morocco in 
Western Sahara. Rather, the Moroccan administration of Western Sahara must 
be said to be conducted in a way which is contrary to the interests and well-
being of most of the Saharawi people traditionally inhabiting Western Sahara, 
both regarding the extraction of natural resources29, and regarding the presence 
of military, police and gendarmerie, being involved in human rights violations, 
including torture and prohibitions on freedom of assembly30. There are, howev-
er, individual Saharawis who benefit materially from the Moroccan economic 
activities, and who will be strong defenders of maintaining the Moroccan pres-
ence in Western Sahara. 
27. CRAWFORD, J., note 19, 117. 
28. MIGUEL, C.R., Los Acuerdos de Madrid, inmorales, illegales y políticamente suicidas, 
2006, concluding: "España no puede transferir unilateralmente sus responsabilidades de poten-
cia administradora."Available at www.gees.org/articulo/2344; see also MIGUEL, C.R., note 18. 
29. For more information Western Sahara and natural resources, see CHAPAUX, V, "The Ques-
tion of the European Community-Morocco Fisheries Agreement", in ARTS, K. and PINTO LEITE, P. 
(eds), International Law and the Question of Western Sahara (2007), 217 et seq. (232); see also in 
the same book BRUS, M., "The Legality of Exploring and Exploiting Mineral Resources in Western 
Sahara", 201 et seq.; and also in the same book, HAGEN, E., "International participation in the Phos-
phates Industry in Occupied Western Sahara: The Local Content and Global Participation", 267 et 
seq. See also HAUGEN, H.M., "The Right to Self Determination and Natural Resources: The Case 
of Western Sahara", Law, Environment and Development Journal 3(2007) 70 et seq.. 
30. See US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2007: West-
ern Sahara, 2008, available at <www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/102555.htm>; and Amnesty 
International, Amnesty International Report 2008: State of the world's human rights, 2008, sec-
tion on "Morocco and Western Sahara", available at <http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/regions/ 
middle-east-and-north-africa/morocco-and-western-sahara>. 
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II. WILL SPAIN ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IT IS ADMINISTRATIVE 
AUTHORITY FOR WESTERN SAHARA, AND WHICH 
IMPLICATIONS WOULD THIS HAVE? 
The above conclusion that Spain is still the administering authority of 
Western Sahara is most probably surprising to many. Spain has not related to 
Western Sahara in any particular way since 197631. As Morocco as the occupy-
ing State is most involved with Western Sahara, while Spain as the de jure ad-
ministering authority does not fulfill its mandate, the peoples of Western Sahara 
are faced with a particular vulnerability among the international community of 
States. 
This Section will analyze the different scenarios regarding Spain's interna-
tional responsibilities regarding Western Sahara. 
There are three scenarios regarding a Spanish response to this acknowl-
edgement that Spain is still administering power in Western Sahara. First, Spain 
can totally deny this fact. Second, Spain can recognize that it is administering 
power over Western Sahara, and seek to comply with its obligations, in particu-
lar regarding Article 73(e) of the UN Charter. Third, Spain can recognize that it 
is administering power, but without any capacity to fulfill its obligations. 
Strong predictions are impossible to make, but some reflections will be 
made. Regarding the first scenario, continued relative passivity from Spain with 
regard to Western Sahara is likely32, as any Spanish move to regain a position 
as administering power over Western Sahara will create tensions with Morocco, 
including over the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla in Northern Morocco. 
Regarding the second scenario, an obligation that has been ignored for 
more than 30 years is not likely to be revived, and this scenario does not seem 
likely. It cannot be expected that Spain by complying with Article 73(e) of the 
UN Charter will admit that is has ignored this specific international responsibil-
ity for more than 30 years. 
Regarding the third scenario, this scenario is less likely than the first but 
more likely than the second, as Spain only needs to recognize that the unilateral 
declaration made 26 February 1976 was incompatible with international law 
requirements regulating self-determination. The consequences of presenting 
31. Spain has now sold its 35 per cent of its share in the Bou Craa phosphates mine that 
Spain controlled in accordance with the 14 November 1975 Madrid Agreement, which was also 
entered into in contradiction with international law as outlined above. 
32. MIGUEL, C.R., "The Self-Determination Referendum and the Role of Spain", in Arts 
and Pinto Leite, note 29, 305 et seq.. 
364 A.E.D.I., vol. XXV (2009) 
THE UN AND WESTERN SAHARA - REVIVING THE UN CHARTER 
such recognition do not have to be considered by the Spanish government. The 
Spanish authorities would then have to refer the situation to the United Nations, 
whose action will analyzed below. 
Hence, scenario one is most likely, scenario two is least likely, while sce-
nario three is somewhere between the other two. 
It is found that any action to maintain the current status quo, in other words 
scenario one, is actually incompatible with international law as recognized by 
the UN Charter and subsequent conventions and resolutions. Therefore, sce-
nario three -to acknowledge Spain's status as a de jure administering authority 
and refer the situation to the UN- is in accordance with the UN Charter. 
A request by the UN General Assembly to the International Court of Jus-
tice (ICJ) asking for an Advisory Opinion on which State is the de jure admin-
istering authority over Western Sahara is an appropriate starting point. 
The basis for placing a non-self-governing territory under the trusteeship 
system is Article 77.1(c) of the UN Charter, which reads: 
"The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following cat-
egories as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements: [...] 
territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their ad-
ministration ". 
Crawford finds that no territories have been placed under the trusteeship 
system in accordance with Article 77.1(c)33. The term "placed" is the most rel-
evant in this context. Can this term as used in the latter part of the Article be 
understood to imply that it is the privilege of the administering power to decide 
whether or not the territory over which it is responsible should be a trust terri-
tory? This status implies that a territory comes under the supervision or admin-
istration of an administering authority, acting in accordance with a trusteeship 
agreement approved by the UN. 
Article 77.1(c) must be understood only to allow the State which is the 
administering authority over a non-self-governing territory in accordance with 
Chapter XI of the UN Charter can only refer the situation to the UN, not to dic-
tate the terms of a trusteeship agreement under Chapter XII of the UN Charter. 
Section TV below will analyze which role the administering authority for a non-
self-governing territory will have in the drafting of the trusteeship agreement. 
With regard to mandates, regulated by Article 77.1(a) of the UN Charter, the 
33. See note 19, 117, n 73. 
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pattern is that the State which held the mandate over a territory also was asked to 
continue as the administering authority under the trusteeship system. There is no 
precedence which implies that this also applies to non-self-governing territories. 
In summary, as the Spanish government's unilateral declaration of 26 Feb-
ruary 1976 cannot be said to have any effect under international law, a confir-
mation can be made by Spain saying that the procedures for the Saharawis to 
exercise their right to self-determination and Western Sahara to achieve self-
government have not been complied with by this unilateral declaration, and 
then chose to refer the situation to the UN. This act by Spain cannot be said to 
result in the deterioration of the relationship between Spain and Morocco. 
The interesting question is then what the UN Charter instructs the UN to do. 
III. UN ADMINISTRATION FOR WESTERN SAHARA? 
We have seen that the UN Charter provides for the placing of a non-self-
governing territory under the trusteeship system. We will now proceed to ana-
lyze the general procedures for placing a territory under the trusteeship system, 
including how the administering authority is identified under the UN Charter. 
Chapter XII of the UN Charter establishes an "international trusteeship sys-
tem". According to Article 75 of the UN Charter this system shall provide for: 
"...the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed 
thereunder by subsequent individual agreements ". 
The basis for a territory to be placed under the trusteeship system is a 
specific agreement, which has to be approved by the United Nations. In those 
situations where the territory is "strategic", the Security Council is given the 
authority to approve a trusteeship agreement, in accordance with Article 83.1: 
"All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including 
the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or 
amendment shall be exercised by the Security Council". 
Only one territory has been classified as a "strategic area", namely the Pa-
cific Islands34. It is impossible to predict if this will remain the only "strategic 
34. S/RES/21 of 2 April 1947. The Pacific Islands are currently known as Micronesia, Mar-
shall Islands, Palau and Northern Mariana Islands. The three former are independent and have 
entered into a Compact of Free Association with the US, while the latter is a commonwealth in 
political union with the US. 
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area" under the Trusteeship system. As observed in the Commentary on the 
UN Charter: "A trust territory becomes a strategic territory if the trusteeship 
agreement says so" 3 5. The existence of US nuclear test station, and the situation 
resulting from the Japanese occupation of these islands are the reasons why the 
Pacific Islands was defined as "strategic". Western Sahara has no military bases 
or stations, but might be strategic due to its coast line, resources and transit ter-
ritory for African immigrants seeking to enter EU. If a trusteeship agreement 
should be approved for Western Sahara, which is -as explained above- only 
a scenario, it is impossible to predict if this trusteeship agreement will define 
Western Sahara as a strategic area or not. Moreover, it is impossible to predict 
if one or more of the veto powers of the Security Council would actually apply 
this power in the process of approving the trusteeship agreement, provided that 
the agreement defines Western Sahara as "strategic". 
The Trusteeship Council, which is the organ that most persons would think 
of in connection with the trusteeship system, is only mentioned twice in Chap-
ter XII of the UN Charter. First, Article 83.3 reads: 
"The Security Council shall, subject to the provisions of the trusteeship 
agreements and without prejudice to security considerations, avail itself of the 
assistance of the Trusteeship Council to perform those functions of the United 
Nations under the trusteeship system relating to political, economic, social, and 
educational matters in the strategic areas.". 
Second, Article 85 regulates areas not designated as strategic, saying that 
in these areas, the functions shall not be exercised by the General Assembly. 
Article 85.2 reads: 
"The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General As-
sembly shall assist the General Assembly in carrying out these functions ". 
Hence, the crucial UN body under the trusteeship in any trusteeship agree-
ment is not the Trusteeship Council, but the General Assembly. The Trusteeship 
Council shall only assist the General Assembly and the Security Council, in the 
case of "strategic areas". The inactivity of the Trusteeship Council is therefore 
no argument against the potential approval of trusteeship agreements in the 
future by the UN 3 6. 
35. SIMMA, J3. (ed), see note 19, 1124. 
36. A presentation on the Trusteeship Council says: "all Trust Territories have attained self-
government or independence, either as separate States or by joining neighbouring independent 
A.E.D.I., vol. XXV (2009) 367 
HANS MORTEN HAUGEN 
Article 75 also says that he tasks of "administration and supervision" shall 
be exercised by an administering authority, and can be exercised by a particular 
State (or as in the case of Nauru; three States), or by the United Nations itself. 
This is clear from the last sentence of Article 81 of the UN Charter: 
"Such authority, hereinafter called the administering authority, may be one 
or more states or the Organization itself. 
While the UN Charter provides for the UN itself to serve as the administer-
ing authority, the UN has not itself exercised such authority based on Chapter 
XII of the UN Charter. There are, however, recent examples from UN temporal 
administration of territories, based on chapter VII of the UN Charter37. In the 
case of Western Sahara, it can be argued that no individual State stands out as an 
obvious choice. Spain has proven not to live up to its international responsibil-
ity. France has always been siding with its former colony Morocco. In addition 
to France, USA and the United Kingdom initially were positive to the never-
approved "Baker I" plan of 2001 3 8. While the term "referendum" appears in 
this never-approved plan, the plan did not adequately provide for the exercise 
of self-determination in accordance with the most relevant UN resolutions39. 
Provided that the objective of an administering authority is to comply with 
Article 76 of the UN Charter, an administering authority must actually promote 
the trust territories "self-government or independence"40. As UN is one of the 
possible administering authorities of a trust territory, it cannot be excluded that 
countries. [...] The Trusteeship Council, by amending its rules of procedure, will now meet as 
and where occasion may require". See: UN: "Trusteeship Council"; available at <http://www. 
un.org/Depts/dpi/decolonization/council.htm>. 
37. Kosovo and East Timor; see notes 14 and 70 for relevant literature analyzing these 
forms of administration, and note 64-75 and accompanying text for more details on these two 
UN administrations over the respective territories. 
38. The "Framework Agreement on the Status of Western Sahara", UN Doc. S/2001/613, 
Annex 1, was in the end only approved by Morocco, never by the Security Council, unlike the 
Peace plan for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, UN Doc, S/2003/565, Annex 
1, which was approved by S/RES/1495, but never approved by Morocco. 
39. A/RES/1514(XV) (see note 3) and A/RES/1541(XV) (see note 15). 
40. Article 76(b) of the UN Charter says that "the basic objectives of the trusteeship sys-
tem" is (extracts) "to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of 
the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-govern-
ment or independence..." While the paragraph continues with the formulation ".. .as may be ap-
propriate to the particular circumstances of each territory..." this cannot be interpreted to ignore 
the general principle of self-determination, but only that the process towards self-determination 
must take into account the particular circumstances that may warrant a slower process, but never 
a reversal of a process towards self-determination. 
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the UN will be asked to undertake this task, in order to provide for a process of 
self-determination by the means of a free and fair referendum for the peoples 
of Western Sahara. 
An argument against the involvement of the United Nations as adminis-
tering authority is the costs that this would imply. This argument is relevant. 
In this context, however, one must also take into account the costs of the UN 
observer mission to Western Sahara, MLNURSO, which has now been ongoing 
for 18 years, and which could potentially go on for another decade or so. In 
this context of the alternative involvement of the UN, which has not produced 
substantial political results regarding the process towards self-determination, 
the costs of a likely term of one year prior to a referendum and one to three year 
after the conduct of a referendum to establish the appropriate institutions to 
maintain law and order and a social infrastructure, cannot as such be said to be 
an argument against the possibility of a UN acting as a temporary administering 
authority under a trusteeship agreement. 
An agreement regarding a non-self-goveming territory can only be a trus-
teeship agreement by being approved either by the Security Council with re-
gard to "strategic areas" or by the General Assembly with regard to "areas not 
designated as strategic", in accordance with Article 83.1 and 85.1 of the UN 
Charter, respectively. If the trusteeship agreement is not approved, the agree-
ment will not enter into force. 
In summary, we see that the UN Charter provides for both the General 
Assembly and the Security Council to exercise the functions of the United Na-
tions, but the latter has only once been involved in the approval of a trusteeship 
agreement and the subsequent supervision of the agreement. Whether Western 
Sahara does qualify for being considered a "strategic area" is not possible to de-
termine. If the General Assembly is asked to approve a trusteeship agreement, 
the needed majority would most likely be obtained. If the Security Council, on 
the other hand, were acting on behalf of the UN when asked to approve a trus-
teeship agreement due to the wording of the agreement, the veto power of the 
permanent five members must be taken into account. 
IV. THE PROCEDURE FOR DECIDING ON A TRUSTEESHIP 
AGREEMENT 
The procedure for adopting the trusteeship agreement will be analyzed. 
Article 79 of the UN Charter defines how the trusteeship agreements shall be 
agreed upon. It reads: 
A.E.D.I., vol. XXV (2009) 369 
HANS MORTEN HAUGEN 
"The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trustee-
ship system, including any alteration or amendment, shall be agreed upon by the 
states directly concerned, including the mandatory power in the case of territories 
held under mandate by a Member of the United Nations, and shall be approved as 
provided for in Articles 83 and 85 ". 
Article 83 is on the Security Council's approval and Article 85 is on the 
General Assembly's approval of the trusteeship agreement. 
The term "states directly concerned" is an open phrase, which must be 
clarified.41 There is no jurisprudence from the ICJ to determine what "states di-
rectly concerned" means. The phrase "states immediately concerned" is applied 
in the Statute of the ICJ, Article 67, which reads: 
"The Court shall deliver its advisory opinions in open court, notice hav-
ing been given to the Secretary-General and to the representatives of Members of 
the United Nations, of other states and of international organizations immediately 
concerned". 
It seems reasonable that the two phrases "immediately concerned" and 
"directly concerned" refer to a situation where a State will be affected by an 
agreement taken. The phrase "states directly concerned" has also been applied 
in one General Assembly resolutions42, in the context of serious disputes or 
conflicts. The application of the phrase "states directly concerned" in this con-
text does not alter the general understanding that a State must be affected. 
41. The analysis will not address the issue of obligations erga omnes, which are obliga-
tions which are "owed to the international community as a whole, with the consequence that 
all States in the world have a legal interest in the compliance with the obligation" (UN Doc. A/ 
CN.4/507: Report by ILC Special Rapporteur James Crawford, 2000, paragraph 106 (a)). See 
also I.D. Seiderman, Hierarchy in International Law: The Human Rights Dimension, 2001,125: 
"Obligations erga omnes [...] are not themselves primary or substantive rules of international 
law, but are rather obligations that give rise to certain legal consequences, or secondary rules of 
international law. "There is general agreement that obligations erga omnes include prohibition 
against aggression and the right to self-determination. 
42. A/RES/43/51 (1988) ("Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and 
Situations Which May Threaten International Peace and Security and on the Role of the United 
Nations in this Field") contains several paragraphs on "states concerned", but only two refer-
ence to "states directly concerned". This is paragraph 20 which reads: "The Secretary-General, 
if approached by a State or States directly concerned with a dispute or situation, should respond 
swiftly by urging the States to seek a solution or adjustment by peaceful means of their own 
choice under the Charter and by offering his good offices or other means at his disposal, as he 
deems appropriate" and paragraph 21 which reads: "The Secretary-General should consider ap-
proaching the States directly concerned with a dispute or situation in an effort to prevent it from 
becoming a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security ". 
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To be "affected by a an agreement taken" will most likely apply to States 
which share borders with, or States which have some particular legal relation-
ship with, the territory to which an agreement applies. In the case of mandate 
territory, the wording of Article 79 ("including the mandatory power in the case 
of territories held under mandate") implies that the mandatory power belongs 
to the category "states directly concerned". 
We will now analyze whether also States which has legal relationships to 
the other territories defined in Article 77.1 of the UN Charter, can be considered 
as "states directly concerned". We saw above that Article 77.1(b) applies to a 
territory of "enemy states," while Article 77.1(c) applies to a non-self-govern-
ing territory. The terms of Article 77.1(c), which involves a positive action by 
the "states responsible for their administration", outlines a different procedure 
than the terms of Article 77.1 (b), which involves acts of compulsion against the 
enemy States, in order to weaken these States" strengths and capacities. 
Hence, as the cooperative element that is implied in Article 77.1(c) is 
substantively different from article 77.1(b), the administering authority under 
Article 77.1(c) must be expected to have stronger influence on the terms of a 
trusteeship agreement, while an "enemy state" cannot be expected to have simi-
lar influence. As the wording of Article 79 of the UN Charter explicitly says the 
mandatory power is recognized as a "state directly concerned", such States can 
exert greater influence over the terms of the trusteeship agreement compared 
to the States which are administering authorities over non-self-governing ter-
ritories. The administering authorities over non-self-governing territories must, 
however, be said also to have an interest in how the territory is to be governed. 
This author finds that as Article 79 applies the term "including", the Article 
cannot be read as to categorically exclude administering authorities over non-
self-governing territories from being considered as "states directly concerned" 
if this territory's status is to be amended by a trusteeship agreement43. 
Therefore, in the context of Western Sahara, European States, with the 
exception of Spain, as the administering authority in accordance with Chapter 
XI of the UN Charter, cannot be said to be directly concerned. On the other 
hand, all neighboring States must be considered to be directly concerned. This 
is also reflected in the proposed Peace plan for self-determination of the people 
of Western Sahara approved by the Security Council in 2003 4 4, where both Mo-
43. For a position that this issue has not been controversial, see Simma, note 19, 1120, 
finding that the issue of which are the "states directly concerned", ".. .has in practice not been 
of any further interest". 
44. See note 38. 
A.E.D.I., vol. XXV (2009) 371 
HANS MORTEN HAUGEN 
rocco, Algeria and Mauretania, in addition to Front Polisario, where included as 
signatories. Spain was not included among the signatories. 
The procedures for determining the terms of the trusteeship agreement 
implies that also the UN bodies that are asked to approve the agreement can 
influence its wording. This is particularly relevant in the context of the Security 
Council, where the veto power implies that any agreement to which any of the 
permanent five disagrees, simply will not be approved. 
V. WHICH POWERS SHALL BE EXERCISED UNDER THE 
TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM? 
After this clarification of which States that are likely to be "states directly 
concerned", we will now turn to an analysis of the content of these agreements, 
including the possible tasks that might be served by the United Nations. Four are-
as will be covered: Security; expression of political rights, including political rep-
resentation; social and educational matters; and economics and natural resources. 
Regarding security matters, Article 84 of the UN Charter is on interna-
tional peace and security in the context of trust territories. This Article reads 
(extracts): 
"To this end the administering authority may make use of volunteer forces, 
facilities, and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligations 
towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering au-
thority, as well as for local defence and the maintenance of law and order within 
the trust territory ", 
This must be understood to imply that the administering authority shall 
also have a mandate relating to security issues, and that the recmitment of per-
sonnel from the territory for such security efforts are fully appropriate. 
On expression of political rights, including political representation, it is 
crucial to observe that Article 76(c) of the UN Charter states that: 
"the basic objectives of the trusteeship system [...] shall be [...] to encour-
age respect for human rights andfor fundamental freedoms for all without distinc-
tion as to race, sex, language, or religion ". 
This implies that as political rights, such as the right to vote and the right 
to hold public positions are undoubtedly human rights, the trusteeship agree-
ment must provide for these basic human rights, and ensure that these rights are 
exercised without discrimination. 
372 A.E.D.I., vol. XXV (2009) 
THE UN AND WESTERN SAHARA - REVIVING THE UN CHARTER 
On social and educational matters, the human rights paragraph quoted 
above is relevant, in addition to 76(b) of the UN Charter, which defines as an 
objective of the trusteeship system. 
"to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of 
the inhabitants of the trust territories ". 
A similar formulation is found in Article 83(3) on "strategic territories", 
specifying the obligations of the Security Council. The formulation of Article 
76(b) is general, but if read together with Article 76(c) on human rights, the 
obligations become clearer. 
With regard to economics and natural resources, it must be observed that 
the management of natural resources is not explicitly addressed in the UN 
Charter in the context of the trusteeship system. On the issue of "economic 
activities" there are, however, annual resolutions passed by the General Assem-
bly.45 Interestingly enough, these resolutions only address non-self-governing 
territories, including Western Sahara. Hence, the protection against economic 
exploitation is stronger regarding non-self-governing territories than trust ter-
ritories. 
Since the trusteeship system is currently not operative as there are for-
mally no trust territories, the relevant UN bodies, more specifically the Fourth 
Committee of the General Assembly and the Special Committee on the Situ-
ation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, do currently only relate to 
Chapter XI of the UN Charter. As these two bodies has a mandate which cover 
both Chapter XI and XII of the UN Charter, a potential situation in which a 
territory would be considered a trust territory, and not a non-self-governing ter-
ritory, will not imply that its peoples would loose the ".. .rights of their peoples 
over their natural resources..."46 The obligations on the administrative authority 
are specified: 
"Urges the administering Powers concerned to take effective measures to 
safeguard and guarantee the inalienable right of the peoples of the Non-Self-
Governing Territories to their natural resources and to establish and maintain 
control over the future development of those resources, and requests the admin-
45. See UN Doc. A/RES/63/102: Economic and other activities which affect the interests of 
the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories. The resolution was adopted with 179 votes to 
2 (USA og Israel), with two abstentions (United Kingdom and France). Similar patterns can be 
found regarding previous resolutions. 
46. Ibid., paragraph 3. 
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istering Powers to take all necessary steps to protect the property rights of the 
peoples of those Territories in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the 
United Nations on decolonization"47. 
We see that the obligations are embedded in the context of decolonization. 
Hence, the rights of peoples over their natural resources must be understood to 
apply irrespective of whether the territory is regulated by Chapter XI of the UN 
Charter (non-self-governing territories) or Chapter XII of the UN Charter (trust 
territories). Peoples' or States' sovereignly over natural resources are recog-
nized within international law.48 Territories which have not achieved independ-
ence and the peoples belonging to these territories are, however, in a particular 
vulnerable situation. The annual resolutions of the General Assembly must be 
understood to seek to ensure the rights of the peoples belonging to these ter-
ritories. Different status of a territory, being a non-self-governing territory or a 
trust territory, cannot be a basis for treating peoples belonging to different ter-
ritorial categories differently with respect to their rights over natural resources, 
provided that both territories are non-independent territories. 
In summary, there are certain differences between the administration of 
trust territories and non-self-governing territories. Human rights protection 
is defined more explicitly within the context of trust territories than non-self-
governing territories. On the other hand, the natural resource dimension of the 
right to self-determination seems to be more explicitly recognized for non-self-
governing territories, at least in the General Assembly resolutions. With regard 
to peoples in both territories, however, the purpose of the administration is to 
serve their interests and advancement. 
VI. FACTUAL, STRATEGIC AND INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
At the end of this analysis of the possibility of a trusteeship agreement 
over Western Sahara, there is a need to make some factual, strategic and legal 
considerations. 
On the factual side, the functions that were originally entrusted with 
MLNURSO, as outlined in a document specified to be a proposal by the UN 
Secretary-General and the OAU Chairman "...aimed at a settlement of the 
question of Western Sahara accepted in principle by the parties on 28 August 
47. Ibid., paragraph 9. 
48. See note 4; see also the Convention on Biological Diversity, fourth preambular para-
graph. In general, see N. Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and 
Duties, 1997. 
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1988"49. The original mandate of MINURSO was relatively wide. In the Secre-
tary-General's 1990 report to the Security Council, which was approved by the 
Security Council50, says, under the title "Main elements of the Implementation 
Plan": 
"The United Nations will monitor other aspects of the administra-
tion of the Territory, especially the maintenance of law and order, to en-
sure that the necessary conditions exist for the holding of a free and fair 
referendum"51. 
The formulation "monitor the administration" is the most interesting. It 
is clear from the latter part of the paragraph that this monitoring is relating 
to ensuring the holding of a referendum. Also monitoring of the demobiliza-
tion is part of the 1990 Implementation Plan,52 as further specified in the 1991 
report from the Secretary-General.53 The implementation plan of the 1991 Re-
port contains provisions which allows for the Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary-General to alter the time-table of the operation54. 
The experiences of the MINURSO operation within the territory of West-
ern Sahara in the absence of a process leading towards a referendum are that 
it has limited powers to act in order to ensure general law and order. There 
are instances where Saharawi demonstrators have been taken from inside 
the MINURSO head quarter in El Aaiún, and then severely tortured, without 
MINURSO seeking to prevent this5 5. 
In the 2003 "Peace plan for self-determination of the people of Western 
Sahara", a proposed transitional authority, termed "Western Sahara Authority", 
shall be responsible for the internal security, while Morocco shall be responsi-
ble for the national security56. 
49. S/21360, see note 11, 5. 
50. S/RES/658, reads in paragraph 2: "Approves the report of the Secretary-General, trans-
mitted to the Council in accordance with resolution 621 (1988) with a view to settling the ques-
tion of Western Sahara, which contains the full text of the settlement proposals as accepted by 
the parties on 30 August 1988 as well as an outline of the plan provided by the Secretary-General 
in order to implement those proposals" (note referring to S/21360 omitted). 
51. S/21360, see note 11, paragraph 47(g) 
52. Ibid., paragraph 50. 
53. The Situation Concerning Western Sahara, S/22464 (1991), saying in paragraph 10 that 
MINURSO will consist of civilian, security (police) and military units. 
54. Ibid., paragraph 12 reads (extract): "In either case, the Special Representative may, after 
consultation with me, determine whether circumstance require any alteration in the timetable, in 
accordance with the authority given to him." 
55. Interviews made with Norwegian journalists R. Steinsland and A. T. Nilsen, in El Ay-
oun, April 2005; tape of interviews available. 
56. See note 11, paragraph 8. 
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Neither the 1991 nor the 2003 Peace Plans are explicitly disregarded, even 
if they do not serve as active references for the current negotiations. In this con-
text, it is relevant to observe that the latest Security Council resolution on West-
ern Sahara reads: "Recalling all its previous resolutions on Western Sahara"57. 
Hence, it can be derived from these plans and resolutions that the idea of 
an active UN presence in Western Sahara in the context of the realization of the 
right to self-determination has always been clearly envisaged. 
On the strategic side, some concerns can be expressed regarding the plac-
ing of a territory under the trusteeship system. On the one hand, it can be held 
that to place a territory under the trusteeship system, rather than to provide for 
a referendum, in accordance with A7RES/1514(XV)58, as specified by the Inter-
national Court of Justice 1975 advisory opinion on Western Sahara59, is to take 
one step back. To place a territory under the trusteeship system when the people 
of this territory clearly have the right to be consulted through a referendum, 
does not initially seem as a step in the right direction. 
On the other hand, the impasse of any realistic plan for the exercise of 
self determination for the people of Western Sahara, and the resulting status 
quo which must be seen to favor Morocco as a consequence of its incomes 
from natural resources extraction, in contradiction to recent UN resolutions60, 
calls for a new approach. By establishing Western Sahara as a tmst territory, 
it becomes even more evident that Morocco does not exercise any rights over 
Western Sahara61. Rather, as a power which used aggression and still holds 
large parts of Western Sahara territory by force, acting as an occupying power62. 
Therefore, for Western Sahara, a temporary tmsteeship agreement is pref-
erable to the current situation with the de jure administering authority (Spain) 
not complying with its obligations and a state exercising de facto control as an 
57. See note 2, preambular paragraph 1. 
58. See note 4. 
59. See note 3. 
60. See note 45. 
61. For analyses saying that Morocco cannot exercise any rights with regard to Western 
Sahara or its resources, see notes 19 and 27. This reasoning follows from the fact that Morocco 
is an occupying power over most of Western Sahara, not the administering power. 
62. This allows for the application of those provisions of Geneva Convention (IV) relative 
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949), where Article 6.3 specifies which 
Articles the occupying power shall be bound to comply with, ".. for the duration of the occupa-
tion...". Those Articles which apply during an occupation are Article 33.2, which says: "Pillage 
is prohibited' and Article 49.6, which says: "The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer 
parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies." IV Geneva Convention is, 
however, rarely referred to in the context of Western Sahara. 
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occupying power (Morocco) conducts its policies without regard to the inter-
ests and rights of the peoples belonging to the territory (the Saharawis). 
With regard to institutional issues, meaning how a changed status for West-
ern Sahara best can be addressed by the different bodies of the UN, we must 
build on the analysis of the UN Charter in Section III above. If a trusteeship 
agreement, due to its wording, needs to be approved by the Security Council, 
the process of approving a trusteeship agreement over a strategic territory can 
come to a halt due to the veto power of the five permanent members. 
A situation which is not properly addressed by the Security Council can-
not, in principle, be impossible to present before the General Assembly. There 
are two bases for this "forum shift". First, the terms of the trusteeship agree-
ment can simply be changed so that the agreement must be approved by Article 
85 and not Article 83 of the UN Charter. Then we are still within Chapter XII 
of the UN Charter. 
Second, Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which specifies tasks for the Security 
Council, can also be a basis for General Assembly actions, under specific circum-
stances. The United Nations has a mechanism for referring cases to the General 
Assembly if the Security Council cannot agree on how to address a situation pre-
sented before it. This possibility only applies to Chapter VII-decisions, which will 
be more thoroughly analyzed in the next section. The "Uniting for peace"-reso-
lution says that "...the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately 
with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective 
measures..."63. This resolution shall be applied "...in any case where there ap-
pears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or acts of aggression.. " M . 
Under the current circumstances, the situation in Western Sahara is not of 
such a kind that it is realistic that there will be any action taken under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter. It seems that only by a escalation of the conflict, result-
ing in an even graver humanitarian and human right situation, will there be a 
possibility for a UN action under Chapter VII, as will be analyzed in Section 
VII below. To avoid a situation of increased violence and a deteriorating hu-
manitarian and human rights situation, appropriate action by United Nations, 
based on the UN Charter, might provide the basis for the exercise of the right of 
self-determination for the peoples of Western Sahara. 
To sum up the possible process leading up to a trusteeship agreement for 
Western Sahara, the following procedure stands the highest chance of success: 
63. A/RES/377 (V), 1950, paragraph 1. 
64. Ibid. 
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First, as explained in Section II above, there is a resolution in the General Assem-
bly calling for an ICJ Advisory Opinion clarifying which State is the administer-
ing authority of Western Sahara. Second, there is an appropriate UN response 
to this Advisory Opinion. Third, there is a Spanish recognition that its unilateral 
declaration of 26 February 1976 did not comply with the UN Charter and relevant 
conventions and resolutions on self determination. Fourth, this recognition is ei-
ther immediately followed by a Spanish request to the Security Council to take 
appropriate actions in order to maintain international peace and security, based 
on Article 77.1(c) of the UN Charter, or the Security Council itself claims that the 
Spanish recognition implies that Article 77.1(c) of the UN Charter is applicable, 
without any direct request from Spain to place Western Sahara under the trustee-
ship system by a trusteeship agreement. Fifth, if 'the Security Council is blocked, 
a decision can be taken by the General Assembly. Sixth, provided that the UN 
has established its authority over Western Sahara, by a trusteeship agreement, the 
preparations for a free and fair referendum can take place. 
VII. RECENT UN ADMINISTRATION OF TERRITORIES UNDER 
CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER: ARE THEY RELEVANT FOR 
WESTERN SAHARA? 
This article is based on the assumption that a trusteeship agreement is 
the best and most realistic option with regard to Western Sahara. However, as 
the most recent UN administrations over whole territories have been based on 
Chapter VII, an analysis of potential UN involvement in Western Sahara cannot 
be complete without an assessment of the likely application of Chapter VII, in 
particular a precise understanding of the threshold for acting under Chapter VII. 
The analysis will draw upon the experiences from two UN administrations 
of a territory, namely Kosovo and East Timor. Both these administrations, set 
up in 1999, gave the UN transitional administrative authority. 
First, regarding Kosovo, Security Council Resolution 1244 authorizes the 
UN Secretary-General to: 
"...provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the peo-
ple of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establish-
ing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic selfgoverning 
institutions..."65. 
65. Security Council Resolution S/RES/1244 (1999), paragraph 10 (extracts). 
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Kosovo does, unlike Western Sahara and East Timor, not have a colonial 
past. Hence, the specific resolutions 1514 and 1541 do not apply to Kosovo. 
Therefore, the self-determination that applies to the peoples of Kosovo did not 
extend to determining all aspects of the political status, but primarily the one 
relating to "self-administration"66, in the first phase through the UN developing 
"provisional democratic selfgoverning institutions"67. 
Self-government as applicable to the international civil presence in Ko-
sovo applies to: "Facilitating a political process designed to determine Ko-
sovo's future Status"68. This is a relatively open phrase, particularly when 
remembering that the peoples of Kosovo at this time did not have any rights 
under international law to exercise their right to self-determination through a 
referendum where independence was one of the options. However, the term 
"substantial autonomy" as applied in the resolution also indicates that the 
autonomy that was granted to Kosovo in accordance with resolution 1244, 
was of a particular kind. 
Finally, it is interesting to observe that the explicit acceptance of the overall 
principles enshrined in resolution 1244 had been given by the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia69. This acceptance by the Belgrade authorities was an important 
requirement for the subsequent process towards independence of Kosovo, even 
if independence was not the only possible outcome70. 
66. Ibid., preambular paragraph 11. 
67. Ibid., paragraph 10. 
68. Ibid., paragraph 11(e) (extracts). 
69. Ibid., paragraph 2. 
70. A critical analysis of the Kosovo independence is given in A. Orakhelashvili, "State-
hood, Recignition and the United Nations System: A Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
in Kosovo", Max Planck UNYB 12 (2008), 1. For an analysis of both Kosovo and East Timor, 
see C. Stahn, note 14. The strongest basis for the Kosovo independence is the recognition in 
paragraph 2(3) of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of the Second UN Human 
Rights Conference 1993 (A/CONF.157/23), which reads: "In accordance with the Declaration 
on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among 
States [see note 16] in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, this shall not be 
construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, to-
tally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States 
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples and thus possessed of a Government representing the whole people belonging to 
the territory without distinction of any kind. " In other words, if the principle of equal rights is 
respected for all, and there is a government which is actually representing the whole people, 
the territorial integrity cannot be impaired. If equal rights and representation is not ensured, 
which some argue was the case with Kosovo during most of the 1990s, there can - under 
given circumstances - be a deviation from the principle of territorial integrity. This basis is 
controversial. 
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Turning to East Timor, the basis for the UN administration of East Timor 
was the Peace Agreement of 5 May 199971. It is, however, interesting to be 
aware of the basis for authorizing the establishment of a multinational force, 
with an initial mandate to support the United Nations as the temporary author-
ity, was the current humanitarian and human rights situation which was said to 
",. .constitute a threat to peace and security"72. 
This resolution, on transfer of authority in East Timor to the United Na-
tions, in accordance with the Agreement between Portugal and Indonesia of 
5 May 1999, will be introduced in greater detail in the section below. In the 
current context, it will be noted that the basis for acting under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter was the formulation "peace and security", not the formulation 
"international peace and security" which is the phrase applied in Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter73. The preamble of Security Council resolution 1264 links 
the "threat to peace and security" directly to the humanitarian and human rights 
situation. 
Hence, Security Council resolution 1264 can be said to allow for a wider 
understanding of potential situations where the Security Council can act under 
Chapter VII. This does not imply that the experiences of the UN involvement 
in East Timor can easily be replicated elsewhere. The long involvement of the 
United Nations from 1999 onwards came through five subsequent UN Mis-
sions74, even if it was only under the second of these Missions, UNTAET, that 
the UN acted as the transitional authority. 
The Peace agreement between the Portugese and Indonesian foreign min-
isters, and the UN Secretary-General, on 5 May 1999 was crucial for the sub-
sequent process with regard to East Timor, similar to the agreement with the 
(then) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was crucial for the process with 
regard to Kosovo. 
71. S/RES/1236, Annex I, Article 6, reading (extracts): "...the Governments of Indonesia 
and Portugal and the Secretary-General shall agree on arrangements for a peaceful and orderly 
transfer of authority in East Timor to the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall, subject 
to the appropriate legislative mandate, initiate the procedure enabling East Timor to begin a 
process of transition towards independence." 
72. See S/RES/1264 (), preambular paragraph 14. 
73. See Article 39,43.1,48.1 and 51 of the UN Charter. 
74. United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET - established by S/RES/1246, 11 
June 1999); United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET - established 
by S/RES/1272, 21 October 1999); United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UN-
MISET - established by S/RES/1410, 17 May 2002); United Nations Office in Timor-Leste 
(UNOTIL - established by S/RES/1599, 28 April 2005); and finally, United Nations Integrated 
Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT - established by S/RES/1704, 25 August 2006). 
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After the referendum on East Timor independence or autonomy within In-
donesia was held 30 August, 1999, only four months after the Peace Agreement, 
resulting in a clear vote for independence, and the violence had been ravaging, 
the UNTAET was established as the authority in East Timor.75 The subsequent 
missions, established in 2005 and 2006, have been primarily concerned with 
assisting the East Timorese authorities in maintaining law and order. 
We therefore see that the UN was given the transitional authority task only 
after the referendum was held, and before this, the Indonesian government was 
given the responsibility for maintaining peace and security. This task was not 
fulfilled appropriately76. However, despite the insecurity and material hardship, 
the self determination process for East Timor happened within a very short time 
period, which shows that such swift processes are possible also elsewhere. 
There are a number of strong similarities between the cases of Western 
Sahara and East Timor when it comes to the international law framework, both 
being for several years non-completed examples of decolonization. But there 
are two major differences. First, in East Timor, Portugal never ceded from its 
responsibility as an administering authority, despite the Indonesian occupation. 
Second, the Indonesian authorities were voluntarily signing up to an agreement 
to prepare for a referendum where independence was an explicit option. Mo-
rocco has in the last rounds of negotiations, rejected this as an option. 
A Moroccan consent to a process with regard to East Timor similar to the 
one set in motion with regard to East Timor by the 5 May 1999 Agreement, in 
which independence was one option in the referendum, does not seem likely. 
The strong involvement of the UN in East Timor as a result of this Agreement 
implied that the UN could not be passive when the violence broke out imme-
diately after the result of the referendum was announced. The lowering of the 
threshold to act under Chapter VII must be understood on the background of the 
role of the UN as envisaged in the 5 May 1999 Agreement. 
Therefore, an agreement made in accordance with Chapter XII of the UN 
Charter on the trusteeship system, which places Western Sahara as a trust ter-
ritory under UN administration for the purpose of conducting a referendum, 
seems to be the most realistic option for ensuring the right to self determination 
for the people of Western Sahara. The modalities for the referendum can be 
75. See note 60, paragraph 1, where UNTAET was established, "...endowed with overall 
responsibility for the administration of East Timor and will be empowered to exercise all legis-
lative and executive authority, including the administration of justice." The UNTAET mandate 
was further specified in paragraphs 2 and 3. 
76. See note 62, paragraph 9 (extracts): ".. .the need for credible accountability for the seri-
ous human rights violations committed in East Timor in 1999...". 
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agreed upon when the trusteeship agreement has been established, and the UN 
mandated personnel is actually present. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
The fact is that Morocco is governing most of the territory of Western 
Sahara as a result of an invasion in 1975, without any rights over this territory. 
Moreover, Morocco is under an obligation to fulfill all its obligations under the 
UN Charter, including Article 74 on the general principle of good-neighbourli-
ness with non-self-governing territories. The obligations under the UN Charter 
are specified by conventions and resolutions, including common Article 1 of the 
ICCPR and the ICESCR77, which are not observed by Morocco. 
The article has shown that the current situation, with Spain not fulfilling its 
responsibilities as the administering power, and with Morocco not willing to al-
low for a referendum where independence is an option, is not going to allow for 
the exercise of self-determination for the peoples of Western Sahara. While the 
negotiations are said to be conducted ".. .to provide for the self-determination of 
the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the 
principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations"78, the requirements 
of General Assembly resolutions 1514 and 1541 must be met. The first says that 
all peoples have a right to ".. .freely determine their political status.. ." 7 9 and the 
latter says that "Emergence as a sovereign independent State"80 shall be one of 
the ways through which a non-self-governing territory can have self-government. 
The relevant provisions of the UN Charter are found to be specifically clear 
and concise to enable to United Nations to establish a process within which the 
peoples of Western Sahara can be able to exercise the human right of self-
determination, resulting either in independence or integration with Morocco. 
The time they have been waiting to exercise this right should be an argument 
for choosing a new approach, making more directly use of the UN Charter. 
77. The respective committees supervising the implementation of the Covenants, have stat-
ed: "The Committee notes with regret [...] [f]he fact that no clear solution has yet been found 
to the question of self-determination for the people of Western Sahara" (E/C.12/MAR/CO/3: 
Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Morocco 
(2006), paragraph 13) and "The State party should make every effort to permit the population 
groups concerned to enjoy fully the rights recognized by the Covenant" (CCPR/CO/82/MÁR: 
Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Morocco (2004), paragraph 8). 
78. See notes 1 and 2. 
79. See note 4. 
80. See note 15; see also note 19. 
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